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ABSTRACT 
Many people do all of their banking online, we and our children communicate 
with peers through computer systems, and there are many jobs that require near 
continuous interaction with computer systems. Criminals, however, are also 
“connected”, and our online interaction provides them a conduit into our 
information like never before. Our credit card numbers and other fiscal 
information are at risk, our children's personal information is exposed to the 
world, and our professional reputations are on the line. 
The discipline of Digital Forensics in law enforcement agencies around the 
nation and world has grown to match the increased risk and potential for cyber 
crimes. Even crimes that are not themselves computer-based, may be solved or 
prosecuted based on digital evidence left behind by the perpetrator. However, 
no widely accepted mechanism to facilitate sharing of ideas and methodologies 
has emerged. Different agencies re-develop approaches that have been tested in 
other jurisdictions. Even within a single agency, there is often significant 
redundant work. There is great potential efficiency gain in sharing information 
from digital forensic investigations.  
This paper describes an on-going design and development project between 
Oklahoma State University’s Center for Telecommunications and Network 
Security and the Defense Cyber Crimes Center to develop a Repository of 
Digital Forensic Knowledge. In its full implementation, the system has 
potential to provide exceptional gains in efficiency for examiners and 
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investigators. It provides a better conduit to share relevant information between 
agencies and a structure through which cases can be cross-referenced to have 
the most impact on a current investigation. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Computer Forensics" is defined as "a sub-discipline of Digital & Multimedia 
Evidence, which involves the scientific examination, analysis, end or 
evaluation of digital evidence in legal matters" and "Digital Evidence" is 
defined as "Information of probative value that is stored or transmitted in 
binary form."  [11] Taking these together or, "Digital Forensics" might be 
defined as “Scientific knowledge and methods applied to the identification, 
collection, preservation, examination, and analysis of information stored or 
transmitted in binary form in a manner acceptable for application in legal 
matters.” 
Digital forensics has become an indispensable tool for law enforcement. This 
science is not only applied to cases of crime committed with or against digital 
assets, but is used in many physical crimes to gather evidence of intent or proof 
of prior relationships. The volume of digital devices that might be explored by 
a forensic analysis, however, is staggering, including anything from a home 
computer to a video game console, to an engine module from a getaway 
vehicle. New hardware, software, and applications are being released into 
public use daily and analysts must create new and legally acceptable methods 
to address each of them. 
Law enforcement agencies have widely varying capabilities to conduct 
forensics, sometimes enlisting the aid of other agencies or outside consultants 
to perform analyses. As new techniques are developed, internally tested, and 
ultimately scrutinized by the legal system, new forensic hypotheses are borne 
and proven. When the same techniques are applied to other cases, the new 
proceeding is strengthened by the precedent of prior case. Acceptance of a 
methodology in multiple proceedings makes it more acceptable for future 
cases. 
Unfortunately, new forensic discoveries are rarely formally shared even within 
the same agency. Sometimes briefings may be given to other analysts within 
the same agency, although caseloads often dictate immediately moving on to 
the next case. Very little is shared between different agencies, or even between 
different offices of some federal law enforcement communities. The result of 
this lack of sharing is duplication of significant effort to re-discover the same 
or similar approaches to prior cases and a failure to take advantage of 
precedent rulings that may strengthen the admission of a certain process. 
A need exists to create a “National Repository of Digital Forensic Information” 
to address these issues. Harrison, et. al., [7] proposed a repository for sharing 
information in 2002, but no such effort has been accepted by a significant 
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portion of the law enforcement community in a manner that allows previous 
discoveries to be best applied to future cases even within a single agency. 
Sharing of forensic knowledge between law enforcement agencies is almost 
entirely informal, and based on hearing about previous casework and 
contacting the case agent for more information. 
We propose a design for such a repository that attempts to address many of the 
recognized impediments. The Center for Telecommunications and Network 
Security (CTANS) at Oklahoma State University is collaborating with the 
Defense Cyber Crimes Center (DC3) to implement a system prototype that we 
expect to make available to other cooperating law enforcement agencies. This 
paper outlines major elements of the working design and expected 
impediments to successful widespread implementation. Application of digital 
forensics extends far beyond criminal investigations. DC3, for instance, is a 
defense agency, so the structure of this model encompasses not only criminal 
matters [see Figure 1], but also forensic information for foreign intelligence 
and cyber needs. Approaches in media analysis and other forensic components 
overlap between these areas extensively, so a shared repository that can be 
applied in all areas will be of most benefit. 
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Figure 1: DC3 Digital Forensic Intelligence Model 
2. WORKING DESIGN MODEL 
Through interactions between CTANS and DC3, as well as other law 
enforcement agencies, a working design for the implementation has been 
developed. It allows for a modular implementation of features and a distributed 
structure that recognizes a varying willingness to share information between 
agencies. The major components are: 1) Digital Forensic Information 
Knowledge Base; 2) expert system and best practices for Forensic 
Investigations; 3) certified and available tools index; and 4) forensic case 
index. Each of these is briefly described below. 
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3. DIGITAL FORENSIC INTELLIGENCE KNOWLEDGE BASE 
A “knowledge base” is typically a machine-readable repository of information. 
It goes beyond raw facts about a specific domain, but attempts to capture 
relationships between them and the context in which decisions were made. 
Each investigation and court proceeding are different from any that preceded 
them, although there are many potential commonalities. Given this, it is 
important to capture data, relationships, and contexts. 
The knowledge base is at the core of this project. It is ultimately a type of case 
tracking system that stores all forensic discoveries related to a case from the 
time evidence is seized until the complete forensic analysis is returned to the 
responsible case investigator. Every law enforcement agency has slightly 
different procedures that they follow. Rules of evidence are similar across 
jurisdiction, however, so the basic process of one agency likely has more 
commonalities than differences with any other. Our design was modeled after 
the process employed by the Defense Cyber Forensics Laboratory (DCFL), 
which “provides digital evidence processing, analysis, and diagnostics for any 
DoD investigation that requires computer forensic support to detect, enhance, 
or recover digital media, to include audio and video. This includes criminal, 
counterintelligence, counterterrorism, and fraud investigations.” [10] 
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Figure 2: Cyber Forensics Investigation Model 
Figure 2 graphically depicts this process. Because DCFL processes evidence 
for multiple agencies, they are often not involved in the seizure of that 
evidence, so the point of entry into their cycle is when the evidence custodian 
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receives the materials from any of the investigating agencies. Imaging, 
examiner assignment, media analysis, various reviews, and administrative 
actions follow. 
Each of these steps is well documented and will be entered into the repository, 
along with scans of provided data. It will be indexed on the assigned case 
number, but will also have a full-text search capability to enable one method of 
locating related data from previous cases. A single case may now generate 
reams of paper reports, so a digital method to locate items within any of many 
reports and to eventually create an automatic cross-index of cases has great 
potential to aid future analyses. 
4. EXPERT SYSTEM AND BEST PRACTICES 
Newer examiners learn from the human experts in the lab, however, additional 
support is always welcome. An expert system would guide a user through more 
common forensic analyses with a series of questions, the answers to which will 
generate procedural documents and ask for input based on the results. This is 
not intended to replace human guidance, but may provide ideas about how to 
proceed in a specific case. 
There are numerous articles that explain some best practices in forensics. These 
can then be modified and applied by an analyst as required by a particular 
investigation. There is no recognized central repository of best practices, 
although several exist, such as through the Scientific Working Group on 
Digital Evidence and the United States Secret Service. When these best 
practices are used in a case, or referenced by the expert system, they will 
become a part of the repository to fully explain the context and applied process 
for future examiners. 
5. CERTIFIED AND AVAILABLE TOOLS INDEX 
One of the three parts of DC3 is the Defense Cyber Crime Institute (DCCI). It 
provides legally and scientifically accepted standards, techniques, 
methodologies, research, tools, and technologies for computer forensics to 
meet DoD needs in counterintelligence, intelligence, information assurance, 
information operations, and law enforcement. A major part of that effort is to 
test tools and techniques in a realistic environment for their scientific validity 
and legal admissibility. This information is used to maintain a catalog of tools, 
along with the testing and analysis report for each. An independent validation 
of a tool prior to its application in an investigation provides enhanced 
credibility when presented in a legal proceeding. 
This catalog is current available within the DoD and law enforcement 
community by request to DCCI. This prevents cyber criminals from exploiting 
weaknesses in forensic tools that are discovered in this process. Each item in 
the tools catalog has a testing and evaluation report that serves as partial 
justification for its use in any investigation. By including this in the repository, 
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a given object (along with the report) can be referenced in many different 
cases, without the need to include extensive and repetitive documentation 
across multiple cases. 
There are also many tools that are available and not yet tested by DCCI. They 
may be used by law enforcement agencies, if the case dictates that. Each time a 
tool or technique is applied, that creates a record that supports its use or 
omission in similar future cases. Fully testing and reporting on any tool is a 
very time-consuming process and it is not always possible to wait for full 
vetting, due to time limitations on proceedings. The shared repository allows 
refinement and acceptability to be enhanced among many examiners and 
agencies, even before full testing. 
6. FUSION, SEARCH AND RETRIEVAL CAPABILITIES 
A shared repository is, in a sense, a database.  The primary need of the 
repository is to build capability to fuse various cyber forensics cases into useful 
knowledge for the investigator. Information fusion is the process of 
intelligently combining the information (predictions) created and provided by 
two or more information sources (prediction models). Although there is an 
ongoing debate about the sophistication level of the fusion methods to be 
employed, there is a general consensus that fusion (combining forecasts and/or 
predictions) produces more useful information for decisions to be based upon 
[1]. It has been shown that fusion can improve accuracy, completeness, and 
robustness of information, while reducing uncertainty and bias associated with 
the individual predictors [3]. 
Once implemented, investigators can then use the repository as a data 
warehouse to quickly locate similar cases and capabilities.  However, it is 
important to note that much of the information provided by investigators is in 
text format.  Cyber forensics cases often include long written passage 
documenting the investigation process and the tools used.  Because of this, text 
mining capabilities must be included in the repository. 
Data Mining is the process of identifying valid, novel, potentially useful, and 
ultimately understandable patterns in data [6] stored in structured databases, 
where the data is organized in records structured by categorical, ordinal and 
continuous variables. However, vast majority of real world data is stored in 
documents that are virtually unstructured. According to a recent study by 
Merrill Lynch and Gartner 85 to 90 percent of all organizational data is stored 
in some kind of unstructured form (i.e., as text) [9]. This is where the text 
mining fits into the picture. Text mining is the process of discovering new, 
previously unknown, potentially useful information from variety of 
unstructured data sources including organizational documents.  
Benefits of text mining are obvious in the areas where a large quantity of 
textual data is collected from organizational transactions. For example, free-
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form text of user interactions and experiences allows trending over time in the 
areas of problems and complaints, which is clearly input to better equipment 
and system development. By not restricting the feedback to a codified form, 
the subject can present, in her own words, what she experiences and thinks 
about the domain of interest.  
The common applications of text mining include Information Extraction 
(identifying key phrases and relationships within text by looking for predefined 
sequences in text via the process called pattern matching), Topic Tracking (by 
keeping user profiles and, based on the documents the user views, predicts 
other documents of interest to the user), Summarization (possessing and 
summarizing the document to its essence in order to save time on the part of 
the reader), Categorization (identifying the main themes of a document and 
doing so placing the document into a pre-defined set of topics categories), 
Clustering (grouping documents that are similar to each other without having a 
pre-defined set of categories), Concept Linking (connect related documents by 
identifying their commonly shared concepts and by doing so help users find 
information that they perhaps wouldn’t have found using traditional searching 
methods), and Question Answering (deals with finding the best answer to a 
given question by knowledge driven pattern matching). 
7. IMPEDIMENTS TO ADOPTION 
There have been previous attempts to create centralized repositories for digital 
forensics. None have succeeded, except on a localized basis. The reasons most 
often cited are 1) a desire for discovering agency to completely control the 
data; 2) concerns about confidentiality or classification of data; 3) increased 
task load of entering data to support this initiative; and 4) concerns about 
unnecessary discovery provided to the defense or that more public information 
will help criminals avoid capture and/or prosecution;. This section overviews 
each of these concerns and provides an illustrative example of how our design 
for information structure leaves control of these important characteristics to the 
individual agencies. 
7.1 Reluctance to Share Information Between Agencies 
Jurisdictions of various law enforcement agencies overlap geographically. 
Within a single location, there may be a County Sheriff, City Police, State 
Police, and various federal agencies, any of which may investigate a crime 
depending upon the circumstances. There is a great sense of ownership of 
criminal case by investigators, so this overlap creates a kind of competition 
between the groups.  Furthermore, law enforcement professionals and, more 
specifically, cyber security professionals tend to rely more on personal social 
networks rather than more formal repositories of information thus impeding 
information sharing in this domain [8]. 
This clearly extends to new systems. Individual investigators are very willing 
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to seek helpful information that is made available from any source, however, 
most have a great reluctance to release information beyond what is required. 
This is partially due to the aforementioned competitive nature, but also is done 
to protect their techniques from current and future criminals who may improve 
their skills with any knowledge that is available. Unfortunately, a knowledge 
repository will require wide input in order to leverage the knowledge of others, 
so this hurdle must be overcome. 
The proposed system provides optional authorship recognition to investigators 
and agencies that contribute information that is used (and therefore linked) to 
another case. Cases that are repeatedly cited would be clearly recognizable as 
“critical” by their peers. The amount of information provided in that 
recognition would be up to the providing agency.  However, recognition has 
proven to be a successful reward mechanism in the organization science 
literature [4].  Access to this system will be limited to DoD and law 
enforcement, except as is required by law. This mitigates the concern about 
criminals using the information to improve their own skills. 
7.2 Classification Issues 
Particularly in the DoD and Federal investigative agencies, some cases, or 
portions thereof, may be classified. In that case, the documents, evidence, and 
systems must be properly secured, and personnel with access must be 
appropriately cleared. An open sharing system is not an option in this case. 
Individual agencies, however, can implement instances of our system to create 
a knowledge base of their own classified projects, with access restrictions on a 
per-user basis. They may also access their own or separate systems to assist in 
the case on an unclassified system and network.  Further, individual 
investigators in the organization may allow members of their personal social 
network to access their knowledge.  The level of the access can be control by 
the sharing investigator. 
7.3 Increased Task Load 
Requiring members of investigative agencies to input data will increase their 
task load.  The individual agencies already have information collection 
mechanisms.  Any attempt to require investigators to input data into a central 
repository will increase their workload.  As such, even those that would want 
to share information would not do it because they have other priorities.  This is 
a problem often overlooked by well-meaning researchers who develop 
impressive data repositories and wonder why investigators will not contribute 
to their content. Initially, system data within the DC3 system is taken entirely 
from electronic worksheets that the analysts already use. As part of the normal 
case maintenance a clerk submits the entire file to the system, which 
automatically parses and indexes it. Our approach allows organizations to 
maintain their own data repositories and requires minimal increase in taskload. 
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7.4 Discovery Vulnerability 
Reticence to share information across agencies can be driven by a variety of 
factors.  One such factor is the concern over disclosure of practices and 
techniques that will be ultimately be nullified by a general awareness among 
the public and more specifically those committing offenses.  While the security 
of such information may be easily protected with regard to casual observation, 
if disclosure is mandated as part of any court order or legal proceeding, the 
efficiency of some digital forensic science methodologies may be reduced.  
Initially, by observing appropriate protocols in the cataloging of information, 
this risk is minimized.   
There are certain legal protections in place that also reduce the potential for 
disclosure of law enforcement techniques and methods including those that are 
related to digital forensics. For example, the Freedom of Information Act, 5 
U.S.C. § 552 clearly exempts from disclosure “records or information 
compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the 
production of such law enforcement records or information….would disclose 
techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, 
or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or 
prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk 
circumvention of the law…” 
In court proceedings, discovery of digital forensic techniques by defendants in 
criminal cases may also be limited under the privilege recognized by the 
Eleventh Circuit court in United States v. Horn 789 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir. 1986).   
A subsequent case of United States v. Garey, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23477, 
summarized that court’s holding as “In general, the Eleventh Circuit and other 
courts applying the investigative techniques privilege have held that where the 
defendant has access to evidence, such as the product of the surveillance, from 
which a jury can determine the accuracy and validity of the surveillance 
equipment and techniques, the defendant has no need for the information that 
outweighs the government's interest in keeping it secret.” 
8. ANCHORED FLEXIBLE LOGICAL MESH STRUCTURE TO LIMIT 
IMPEDIMENTS 
Every agency has different issues with data sharing and must be given the 
flexibility to determine the degree to which they will use data provided by 
others and/or contribute information about their discoveries to the community. 
Of course, the global benefit is maximized by everyone sharing all discoveries 
with all other groups, so there must be stimulus for that. Our model can be 
termed an “anchored, flexible, logical mesh.” It is anchored on a core 
repository that will contain information made available to all authorized 
agencies without restriction. For example, the core repository may contain 
information on relevant laws and legal precedents that all forensics 
organizations may want to access.  Ideally, it would house the common 
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knowledge that all organization would typically maintain and therefore remove 
the need for individual agencies to store and update the information 
themselves.  Most participants will at least read information from the core 
repository. Relationships between servers are entirely flexible and up to the 
administrators of the servers themselves. 
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Figure 3: Anchored Logical Mesh of Repository Servers 
Figure 3 shows several different examples of how this may be implemented. 
The diagram is not intended to reflect current or planned cooperative 
relationships between specific agencies that might participate in the repository. 
It is provided purely as a notional illustration: 
? The DoD has a repository for storing information that they want to 
make available to their investigative agencies, but not outside the 
DoD, although the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), the 
Air Force Office of Special Investigation (AFOSI), and their field 
offices can directly use and contribute to the core repository as well, 
or retain data only within their agency without elevating it even to the 
level of DoD. 
? The FBI offices have a similar structure, but one of the field offices 
may cooperate extensively with one of the NCIS or AFOSI field 
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offices in the same city and liberally share new discoveries with each 
other. This creates a new “neighborhood” that is labeled “local coop” 
in the figure. 
? Small agencies may have a single repository for their lessons learned, 
but they share with the core repository. In the extreme, there may be 
no local storage at all, but a web interface directly into the core 
repository. A small sheriff’s office with a forensic capability can 
leverage the lessons learned in many other participating agencies with 
little investment. 
? Some data is very sensitive. In the figure, the NSA is shown with a 
neighborhood among its own central node and field offices, but only 
as a consumer of data from the central repository. This will not benefit 
other agencies; however, some organization’s requirements will 
prohibit sharing information. 
? Finally, there will be some agencies that choose to be entirely isolated. 
They can neither benefit from the central repository nor enhance it, 
because of a logical and/or physical separation. The underlying system 
design, however, allows them to share among their own 
neighborhood, while retaining complete control of hardware, software, 
and data. 
Although there are certain impediments to the building a National Forensic 
Repository, the literature suggests that many of these can be overcome by 
employing various strategies toward promoting information sharing, protecting 
internal investigative procedures, and providing a multi-level approach.  The 
strategies should help mitigate agencies’ concerns toward using such a system.  
Investigators may still rely on their social networks for information regarding a 
case investigation, however our approach offer a means of providing 
standardization to the process.  It allows investigator to share information 
while preventing release of internally sensitive data. 
9. CONCLUSION  
Network technology available to the average consumer has rapidly expanded. 
Valuable information about many facets of our lives resides on computer 
systems and traverse public networks. The value of this information and the 
potential value of the misuse of that information create increasing motivation 
to criminals to commit cyber crime. Law enforcement agencies at all levels 
have met this challenge with new investigative techniques and digital forensic 
analysis to compliment their existing skills. An information repository that 
allows these geographically and bureaucratically diverse groups to share 
information about cyber crimes and digital investigation would aid every 
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agency in successfully and efficiently prosecuting a case. 
An ongoing project between Oklahoma State University and the Defense 
Cyber Crimes Center aims to meet this growing need. The National Repository 
of Digital Forensic Information will provide a platform for tracking details of 
cases as they are handles and a reference system to previous investigations that 
might be related. It will also provide a relevant legal index to help gauge the 
success of various prior approaches in court and an expert system to assist 
investigators who are assigned to case types that are less familiar to them. 
There are many non-technical impediments to widespread adoption of the 
system to make it most valuable. Although some of the recognized issues have 
been addressed in this paper, more work must be done in this area. A full cross-
agency implementation of this system has the potential to greatly leverage 
existing examiner and investigator skills and to allow newer investigators to 
more quickly acquire the best approaches for successful legal proceedings. 
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